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Abstract— A pay-as-bid curtailment market, where Wind 
Power Plants (WPPs) may offer prices to have their output 
reduced in the event of network balancing or stability 
constraints, is one approach towards the market integration of 
a high proportion of wind energy onto a power system. Such a 
market aims to procure curtailment at a cost close to the 
marginal value of the electricity plus renewable subsidies and 
incentives, reducing risks for WPPs while minimising costs to 
the Independent System Operator (ISO). Through the use of 
game theory and market modelling, a key set of bidding 
strategies are identified that may evolve within such a market, 
which may act in opposition to the goals of the ISO. These are 
applied to a variety of network conditions in order to 
determine their likely impact and the resulting bidding signals 
provided to market participants. Bidding behaviours and 
market fluidity may also be affected by factors particular to 
wind power plants. Through analysis of both ex ante and ex 
post case studies, the existence of these behaviours is 
demonstrated, illustrating that a pay-as-bid curtailment 
market may not be efficient at price discovery in practice.  
Keywords: Power generation dispatch; power system 
economics; wind energy; game theory. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the proportion of energy derived from wind 
generation increases in response to legislation on emissions 
targets, economic operation of power systems has to take 
into account the uncertainty related to wind power and the 
additional difficulties and costs required in balancing 
generation and demand. The inherent variability of wind 
power combined with locational inter-dependence means 
that there is a significant requirement for effective 
management of network congestion through wind power 
curtailment on systems with high wind energy penetration 
targets [1]. As wind power plants (WPPs) are not 
dispatchable in the same manner as conventional generators, 
with a stochastically variant power output, the Independent 
System Operator (ISO) may have a reduced ability to 
control WPP output in maintaining a system balance 
between load and generation [2]. 
Connection agreements for WPPs may be divided into 
two categories: firm connections, where the ability to export 
power up to a given limit is guaranteed and compensated for 
by the ISO where not available; and non-firm connections, 
where the ability to export power is not guaranteed and 
subject to local network conditions. Normally, the 
availability of a firm connection right is dependent on 
necessary network reinforcement works being completed,  
both for the connection to the main interconnected system 
and any deeper reinforcements deemed to be required within 
it, whereas non-firm connections permit the connection of 
additional generation to the network prior to, or during, 
network reinforcement. In Britain, the requirements for 
network reinforcement in respect of transmission 
connections are primarily determined by the design rules 
within the ‘Security and Quality of Supply Standard’ 
(SQSS). Up to August 2010, connection before the network 
was fully compliant with the stipulations of the SQSS was 
possible in accordance with ‘customer choice’ rules but 
would grant only non-firm rights. In August 2010, under an 
arrangement known as ‘connect and manage’, firm rights 
would be granted even before the deeper reinforcements 
have been completed [3]. 
Where the forecast or actual output of WPPs exceeds 
demand or network capacity, actions may have to be taken 
by the Independent System Operator (ISO) to curtail the 
output of WPPs. A number of mechanisms for allocating 
curtailment volumes to WPPs have been used in different 
energy markets [4], and one class of mechanisms involves 
the use of market principles in order to induce efficient 
dispatch and the discovery of real costs. This also ensures 
that the merit order is not subject to discrimination by the 
ISO, in keeping with the competitive aims of a deregulated 
energy market. 
In this paper, a pay-as-bid curtailment market for WPPs 
with firm connection agreements is described in Section II, 
and analysed using principles of game theory to determine 
the behaviours of participating WPPs. This form of 
modelling applied to electricity markets is demonstrated in 
previous analyses of spot markets and electricity market 
power [5],[6], and allows a description of the potential 
efficiency of a curtailment market in operation. An ex ante 
case study for the future operation of wind power on the 
Shetland Islands is discussed in Section III, followed by an 
ex post analysis of data from the Balancing Mechanism used 
in the electricity market of Great Britain in Section IV, 
illustrating the influence of commercial considerations for 
WPPs on the operation of a balancing market. 
II. BALANCING MARKET ANALYSIS 
A. Market Description 
One feature of a balancing market is that it permits the 
ISO to reduce the energy exported by each WPP in a fixed 
time period, equating to a market round, where the total 
generation of all WPPs exceeds the local network capacity. 
Each WPP may submit volumes (MWh) and prices 
(£/MWh), for each time period, that would be paid by the 
ISO to curtail output from that WPP. There is only one 
round of bids per time interval. Market closure is 
sufficiently near to the dispatch horizon that it may be 
assumed that each WPP has perfect knowledge of its 
uncurtailed power output. If the ISO purchases curtailment 
volumes from multiple WPPs, it pays the price of each (pay-
as-bid) as opposed to a common pool or marginal price. 
Curtailed energy can be treated as a homogenous good, 
and because each WPP has a fixed uncurtailed output for 
each market round, the competition is based on price rather 
than quantity. The participants within the market will be 
defined by the network topology and resultant transfer 
constraints, and so the list of WPPs in the market will vary 
on a significantly longer timescale than the market rounds. 
Thus, for the purposes of modelling strategies, the market 
has a constant set of players. 
Suppose that there are   independent WPPs with 
constant marginal costs,               , based on the 
value of uncurtailed energy when sold to an off-taker. The 
capacity of WPP   is   , and the instantaneous uncurtailed 
power output of WPP   is   , considered to be constant for 
the duration of a market round. The ‘footroom’, or amount 
by which a WPP may reduce its output, is considered equal 
to   , i.e. it may curtail output to zero. 
Curtailment demand by the ISO,   , is a random 
variable independent of price and bid quantity according to a 
probability distribution      , reflecting a continuous range 
of network scenarios. It is assumed that curtailment demand 
can always be met by the WPPs participating within the 
market,    [   ]  where   ∑   
 
   . Following the 
submission of bids, WPPs are ranked in bid price order 
            with WPP   as the marginal WPP: 
∑   
   
       ∑   
 
   . 
B. Player Behaviours 
The strategy space    is the set of strategies available to 
WPP  , and a strategy combination                is a 
set of strategies, one for each WPP.    denotes the strategy 
in   of WPP  , with     the subset of   which includes the 
strategies of all WPPs excluding  . The utility to WPP   of 
playing strategy    is given by           . An equilibrium 
set of strategies is given by       
    
      
  , and an 
equilibrium in pure Nash strategies is a strategy combination 
   such that     ,      
             
               and 
  
    
 . In other words, the market will reach an 
equilibrium wherever no increase in a WPP’s utility will 
result from a change in its strategy. 
As the WPPs can only set their bid prices and not their 
uncurtailed power, if    is a pure strategy it must be a bid 
price, or a probabilistically determined bid price if a mixed 
strategy. Precommitment of quantity in a price-based 
Bertrand competition may bring about an oligopoly outcome 
similar to that of a Cournot competition where pricing 
exceeds marginal costs for a homogenous good [7]. The 
utility of each WPP is given by 
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For a set of pure strategies that result in the same rank 
position for a WPP, the dominating strategy will be the one 
that maximizes   . Similarly the set of pure strategies which 
result in any rank position      are dominated by the 
strategy with the maximum value of    , and the dominant 
strategy is for      . The set of pure strategies which 
result in any rank position     may be dominated by 
either the strategy which maximizes    for       or 
    dependent on the values of    and ∑   
   
   . Any 
strategy resulting in rank position     is completely 
dominated. 
In assessing the competitive nature of WPPs in the 
market, the interaction between two WPPs     will be 
characterized and generalized to the   WPP market. It is 
assumed for any WPP pair     in a market round that 
      and      , i.e. that each generator has a unique 
output in each market round and unique marginal cost. In 
such a case, only one WPP will define the pure-strategy 
equilibrium bid price for all WPPs, as any WPP which is 
going to be curtailed which may incrementally increase its 
bid without reducing the probability of being curtailed will 
do so. Conversely, if a WPP increases its bid beyond that of 
another WPP such that it reduces the probability of dispatch 
(i.e. by submitting a price above the marginal cost of the 
marginal WPP) then it may increase its profit by slightly 
undercutting the marginal WPP. 
Under a curtailment scenario, a WPP may reasonably 
determine that in a given market round the other market 






, and the market is hence modelled with each WPP 
having perfect knowledge of all   . This assumption is 
discussed further in section C.  There exist 3 curtailment 
demand scenarios, and each is analysed in turn. 
a)              : 
 
Only one of the WPPs will be curtailed, as each has 
sufficient footroom to meet the ISO’s total curtailment 
requirement in the trading period. Each WPP will increase 
its payoff by undercutting the other until the greater 
marginal cost is reached, and the equilibrium bid for both 
WPPs will be   (     ) . In the   WPP market, the WPP 
with the lowest marginal cost will be dispatched at a bid 
value with the second lowest WPP marginal cost as an upper 
limit.  
b)    (     )                 : 
 
In this case, if the larger of the two WPPs is higher in the 
merit order, then it alone will be dispatched, whereas if the 
smaller WPP is higher in the merit order, it will be entirely 
dispatched and the larger WPP will be partially dispatched. 
In the 2 WPP case, this produces the same result as scenario 
1), in that the equilibrium bid will be    (     ) as both 
WPPs compete to be the first dispatched. In the   WPP 
market, however, any WPP     may increase its bid to 
that of the marginal cost of   without altering its rank 
position, whereas incrementally exceeding the marginal cost 
of   will allow   to undercut   resulting in a greater 
dispatched capacity for a given bid value. Hence the  
dominant pure strategy is the maximum bid giving rank 
   , and the equilibrium bid is    where the WPPs are 
ranked in marginal cost order. 
c)             : 
 
Both WPPs will be curtailed, and may hence increase 
their payoffs by increasing their bid irrespective of the other 
bid value. Both WPPs have an effective monopoly as the 
ISO must purchase curtailment volumes from them both. In 
the   WPP market, if the demand for curtailment is not high 
enough that all WPPs are guaranteed to be dispatched i.e. 
   ∑           
 
   , then the same equilibrium results 
as for scenario 2), with the dominant pure strategy being the 
maximum bid giving rank    , and the equilibrium bid is 
   where the WPPs are ranked in marginal cost order. 
C. Market Knowledge and Power 
The previous analysis demonstrates that even with 
complete knowledge, real price discovery is not achieved by 
the ISO, and costs of curtailment are highly sensitive to the 
difference in marginal costs between WPPs. However, due 
to the stochastic nature of both demand and wind power 
profiles, as well as the geographic variance in wind speed 
between WPP locations, it may be difficult for a player to 
identify the likely marginal player in a constraint scenario 
and bid accordingly. This may result in a subset of players 
electing to artificially raise their price, in order to capitalize 
on infrequent high curtailment events where they can be 
sure of dispatch, as opposed to risking near marginal pricing 
which will reduce their gains in high curtailment scenarios 
while not guaranteeing dispatch in low curtailment 
scenarios. 
Network topologies may also mean that the number of 
participants in a given constraint scenario may be very low, 
and this increases the opportunities for collusion between 
operators, particularly where multiple WPPs are owned by 
single generation companies, or are selling energy to a 
single off-taker. 
D. Extraneous Costs 
The above analysis assumes that the only contributing 
cost towards the price set by the WPP is the unit value of the 
energy. However, there may be additional costs to the WPP 
of curtailing energy, which may disincentivise the WPP 
from participating in the market at or near marginal cost. 
The WPP will have a contractual agreement with an energy 
off-taker which may guarantee the provision of per-unit 
subsidies, such as Renewable Obligation Certificates in the 
UK, or Production Tax Credits in the US. The WPP may 
also be contracted into a profit-sharing arrangement with 
maintenance parties or landowners based around the value 
of generated energy, and so may be restricted from 
voluntarily reducing output. Participation in the market may 
also require significant technical overheads, such as 
automated dispatch of instructions, or 24 hour monitoring 
and response capability, which generates a cost which must 
be recouped through curtailment payments. While it may be 
possible for any WPP to create a single marginal cost which 
adequately compensates for these factors, there will be a 
sensitivity to scale for operational costs, as well as 
interdependency on the market to determine the volume of 
curtailment payments across which extraneous costs should 
be spread. Determining this marginal cost introduces 
uncertainty to the WPP against which they may hedge by 
further increasing the bid price. 
III. EX ANTE CASE STUDY: FUTURE OPERATION OF THE 
SHETLAND ISLANDS NETWORK 
The Northern Isles New Energy Solutions (NINES) 
project being developed on the Shetland Islands distribution 
network aims to introduce Active Network Management 
(ANM) concepts to an islanded network with a wealth of 
potential renewable energy resources [8],[9]. There is 
currently one wind farm with a firm connection for 3.7MW. 
The NINES project aims to increase the total capacity of 
WPP connected to the distribution network, and, at time of 
writing, there are connection applications for approximately 
another 14.5MW of WPPs. 
Table 1 shows an illustrative future scenario for a total of 
20MW of WPP with firm connection agreements. It is 
assumed that, due to economy of scale, the greater the 
capacity of the WPP, the lower the energy price negotiated 
with the off-taker, and hence the lower the marginal price 
for curtailment of energy.  
TABLE I.  LIST OF SIMULATED WPPS 
n    (MW)    (£/MWh)   
     
1 7.0 85 1.00 
2 5.0 87 0.98 
3 3.7 89 1.02 
4 2.5 91 0.99 
5 1.3 93 1.0 
6 0.5 95 0.95 
 
The wind resource model involves the use of an 
exponentially decaying autocorrelation function based on a 
Markov random walk [10]: 
     [ ]   [ ]       
 
where     is the initial probability distribution function 
(pdf),     is the probability vector equivalent to the limiting 
pdf, [ ] is the initial probability distribution function matrix, 
and [ ] is the decay matrix. 
The limiting probability distribution function is set as a 
Rayleigh distribution (a Weibull distribution with shape 
parameter equal to 2) with the average value set as the mean 
wind speed for the wind resource location,    
     . 
This wind resource is then linearly scaled to each wind 
WPP according to their own scaling parameter, assuming 
that the geographical separation between WPPs is not 
significant enough to create a time lag between sites on an 
hourly timescale: 
                
     
 
This wind speed is converted to the power output of the 
site by conversion through a generic wind farm power curve 
and scaling to   . 
 The power demand model consists of 8 diurnal 
distributions, covering 4 seasons split between weekends 
and weekdays derived from historical demand data, and a 
random noise parameter calculated from residuals. 
The maximum total amount of wind generation which 
can be exported by WPPs onto the network is constrained by 
a linear system stability limit particular to Shetland. This is 
defined as a fixed proportion of demand,  , which must be 
supplied by conventional generation, and so any available 
wind power in excess of the difference between total 
demand and the output of conventional generation must be 
curtailed: 
         ∑   
 
   
          
For the purpose of this discussion and as an illustration 
of a possible future arrangement for managing generation on 
Shetland, it is supposed that there is a curtailment market 
that is conducted on a hourly schedule, with each WPP 
aware of all values of      and    prior to submitting 
closed bids in each market round. After each round, the bids 
are shared as common knowledge in order for each WPP to 
amend its strategy. 
Agent-based modelling is used to amend the bidding 
behaviour of the WPPs between each round. Each WPP 
attempts to determine the optimum bid for each of the 3 
cases described in Section II of this paper, using the 
following algorithm, which describes the iterative evolution 
of prices for each WPP  : 
1. Initialisation: set the initial bid triplet to the 
marginal cost: [        ] 
2. Before each market round, determine the 
constraint scenario, and bid the appropriate 
value. 
3. After each market round, given the bids of the 
other WPPs, determine the bid value to the 
nearest £0.01 in the range [       ]that would 
have resulted in the greatest return, and replace 
the corresponding bid triplet entry, to be used in 
the subsequent round, with this value if the 
return would be greater than for the existing 
bid. 
The simulation is run for a year for a range of stability 
limits, and the increased cost to the ISO compared to paying 
WPP marginal costs is shown in fig. 1. As the stability limit 
increases, the proportion of time where curtailment demand 
is high enough to for additional WPPs to sell a curtailment 
service (scenarios 2 and 3) increases, and so WPPs with a 
positive probability of being curtailed may increase their bid 
to a higher equilibrium price, defined as the marginal cost of 
a higher-priced WPP. An increase in   from 0.2 to 0.3 does 
result in a small decrease in cost to the ISO, however, as this 
increases the number of WPPs able to compete in the 
scenario where there is competition by capacity as well as 
price.  
 
Figure 1.  Total curtailment payments made by the ISO over marginal 
cost for different linear stability limits based on 20MW of rated wind 
capacity on Shetland. 
The overall magnitude of the increased cost to the ISO is 
defined by the difference in magnitudes between the 
marginal costs of the various WPPs, weighted towards the 
differences between the consecutive WPPs with lowest 
marginal costs. This means that while the illustrated 
maximum cost increase is 7.5%, this is purely a reflection of 
the relative difference  between the generators with the 
lowest and highest marginal cost, and the increased pricing 
level is highly sensitive to the relative pricing of generators, 
with the potential for far higher cost increases. 
 
IV. EX POST CASE STUDY: WPP BEHAVIOUR IN THE GB 
BALANCING MECHANISM 
In the electricity network of Great Britain (GB), National 
Grid plc (the ISO) operates a market termed the Balancing 
Mechanism (BM), into which generators and consumers 
may supply bids (reductions in generation / increases in 
demand) and offers (increases in generation / reductions in 
demand) for volumes of energy above and below the 
planned level of output or consumption [11]. If the ISO 
needs to increase or reduce generation or consumption as a 
final balancing measure, either due to a local transmission 
constraint or the need to maintain a system-wide balance of 
generation and demand, it will select volumes of energy 
from the set of applicable generators or consumers on a 
price merit order. Only generators connected under a 
Bilateral Embedded Generation Agreement (BEGA) or as a 
directly-connected Balancing Mechanism Unit (BMU) 
participate in the BM, which excludes the majority of 
distribution-connected WPPs. 
There are 58 WPPs registered in the BM, supplying bids to 
reduce output. Analysis of published data shows that these 
have not been marginal bids, and are not used on a day-to-
day basis, but are commonly used when the system is 
nearing peak wind generation and wind output must be 
curtailed to alleviate cross-boundary power transfers. For 
example, in 2012, there was approximately 3.8GW of 
onshore wind generation capacity in Scotland [12], where 
the B6 transmission boundary between the Scottish Power 
and National Grid transmission zones (corresponding to the 
Scotland/England border) had a maximum transfer capacity 
of 2.8GW. In 2013, around 4% of potential cross-boundary 
energy transfer would exceed the B6 capacity, requiring 
constraints to be enacted. Under the 2020 ‘Gone Green’ 
scenario with a greatly increased level of wind generation, 
this would increase to around 40% in the absence of 
reinforcement [13]. While the B6 transfer capacity will be 
increased to 4.4GW by 2015 [14], and subsequently to 
around 8GW in 2020, constraint management is likely to be 
a present and continuing requirement of the management of 
this boundary. 
At 11am on 3
rd
 of February 2013, the ISO reported an 
all-time peak of system wind generation at 5GW. This was 
hence a period where participants could reasonably have 
expected curtailment instructions to be issued. The bid curve 
for WPPs for this time is shown in fig. 2. The bid prices for 
WPPs ranged between -74 £/MWh and the maximum -9999 
£/MWh. 
The bids can be broadly divided into three categories: 
1. 2GW of near-marginal bids (-74 £/MWh to -
140 £/MWh), from WPPs seeking to capitalize 
on the ability to generate frequent small returns 
2. 2GW of ‘opportunistic’ bids (-150 £/MWh to -
350 £/MWh) which seek to generate infrequent 
large returns under occasional conditions of 
high curtailment 
3. 1GW of ‘sleeper’ bids (-700 £/MWh to -9999 
£/MWh) which aim to avoid curtailment 
altogether 
Although participants in the BM can review bids and 
amend their own at a half-hourly resolution, no WPP was 
found to have amended their bid during the rest of the month 
of February 2013, despite a variety of wind and constraint 
conditions. This indicates that WPP bids have a high inertia, 
and this is likely a result of the impact bid acceptance has 
upon the Power Purchase Agreement with the off-taker. If a 
bid is accepted, then the Renewable Obligation Certificates 
(ROCs) associated with the curtailed energy are lost, and a 
mechanism for recouping lost ROC revenue would have to 
exist between the WPP and off-taker. As a result, the WPP 
may be contractually restricted in altering its bids and the 
market will have low fluidity. 
The data also demonstrates that bids may appear which are 
below the marginal cost to the WPP (taken as the value of 
the wholesale energy plus ROCs), and this may be because 
WPPs do not wish to be seen publicly as profiting from what 
may be perceived as a failure to generate during favourable 
wind conditions.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Application of Nash equilibria analysis to a pay-as-bid 
wind curtailment market demonstrates that even under a 
scenario of perfect player knowledge, real price discovery 
will not occur, and WPPs may be able to take advantage of 
high constraint periods to benefit from curtailment pricing 
significantly above marginal costs. This finding is supported 
by modelling of the islanded distribution network supplying 
the Shetland Isles, as well as from historical data of WPP 
curtailment in an existing pay-as-bid balancing mechanism 
in the Great Britain electricity market.  
 
 
Figure 2.  WPP bid curve from the GB Balancing Mechanism at 11am on 
3rd February 2013. A single bid of -9999 £/MWh is omitted for clarity. 
Additionally, there are a number of contractual issues 
particular to wind power which may disincentivise the wind 
power plant’s operator to act as an efficient market player, 
and which may act in opposition to any market-based 
approach to wind curtailment. 
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